Politicien Anglais En 4 Lettres

Acteurs privés à lintérieur le champ politique et la création des politique publiques : des transgresseurs fabricateurs ns normes ?
Journée d’étude du la plate-forme desotoedge.com convecteur les doctorants et jeunes chercheurs

Date limité pour l’envoi des propositions aux communication : le 29 février 2016.

Vous lisez ce: Politicien anglais en 4 lettres

Sélection des les média et réponses de propositions : ns 14 mars 2016.

Lieu et date du la date d’étude : ns 12 mai 2016 jusqu’à Prague, Národní 18, salle ns conférences 7e étage.

Comité d’organisation : Jana Vargovčíková (desotoedge.com & FF UK) et Kateřina Merklová (FF UK)

Langue: anglais.

Comité scientifique : hélène Michel (SAGE, académie d’Études Politiques de Strasbourg), michael Smith (CERGE-EI, un v ČR), Zdeňka Mansfeldová (Institut du sociologie, un v ČR), Ondřej Císař (Institut ns sociologie, un v ČR), Ondřej Slačálek (Départment aux science politique, conférenciers des Lettres, Université Charles jusqu’à Prague).

Les propositions de communication aux 500 mots très sont jusquà envoyer prématuré le 29 février 2016 jusqu’à l’adresse prochain : jana.vargovcikova

Les les média seront discutées par hall Michel (SAGE, académie d’Études politique in Strasbourg) et nom de garçon Smith (CERGE-EI, académie des sciences tchèque).

Call pour Papers

Political activities du private actors ont long since been an object of study in many disciplines de social sciences. In politics science and sociology, the imaginations of “interest group” has served as a particular way ns conceptualizing private actors when they try à influence auditeur decision-making (Courty 2006; Grossman et Saurugger 2006). In the affronter of a cultivation diversity de entities undertaking such activities (e.g. Individual companies, their associations, think-tanks, hybrid networks ns companies and NGOs), some argued that auto definition ns the term must be extended à encompass this variety de actors (Gray et Lowery 1996; Saurugger 2004) when others oui highlighted thé specificities ns the role companies (Mclaughlin, Jordan, et Maloney 1993; Coen 1997; Hart 2008; Ciepley 2013; Landemore et Ferreras 2015) jaune lobbyists (Heinz und al. 1993; Kersh 2002; michel 2005; Courty and Michel 2012) play as actors in politics. The délimitations between the private et the auditeur spheres, however, remains a usual analytical ground to these works, also when castle conclude passant par observing comment the two interlock.

The interweaving relationships of public et private actors have been studied et theorized at least since thé works ns Arthur Bentley and later pluralist et neo-corporatist theories ns state-society relationship (Truman 1959; Schattschneider 1960; Schmitter 1974), theories pointing à rent-seeking behaviour of private gibbs (Tullock 2005) oui well ont studies du transnational national politics emphasizing auto role ns private actors in cette (Mansbach and etc 1976). In recent years however, a corps of literature has emerged that document a development in personal actors’ authorized in politics et policy at many levels du government, which ce relates to auto changes in mode of administration towards much more horizontality and flexibility in producing policy-making fora (Rhodes 1997; patrimoine 2002; Hall and Biersteker 2002; stone 2013; Peters 2009), but also to the state’s transforming regulatory modes et capacities (Majone 1994; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004; Lascoumes et Le Galès 2007).

While some compete these breakthroughs testify to a “retreat du the state” (Strange 1996) or “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1994), others take into consideration that once outsourcing parts of their responsibilities, states are indeed keeping control over auto process, and remain, in fine, revendeur agréé of autorité delegation et “accomplices” du the growing role of private actors (Wright 1994; Knill et Lehmkuhl 2002; green 2013). Still, this rising aller taken by private gibbs in politics and policy has venir be read in the context of what has come à be labelled ont a crisis of representation. As public authorities space striving to ground more firmly your legitimacy, they room opening windows du opportunity pour actors toujours deprived ns a formalized role in politics à negotiate their place in the public sphere.

As thé dichotomy underpinning most de this literature suggests, as soon as private gibbs develop tasks in stimulate to conséquences sur the opération of norms, they have the right to be seen oui transgressing borders between the private et the auditeur sphere.

Our lieu de travail will se concentrer on auto management, thé implications, and the meanings of such transgressions, both analytical and normative:

(1) since norm-production et oversight ont been crucial elements de the classical limites between auto public and private spheres at least from the formant of modern-day state, thé very foundations of such délimitations may be questioned with private actors’ boosting involvement in public decision-making.

(2) the analytical distinction, however, cannot completely be separated native a normatif one, thé private actors’ involvement periodically leading to a transgression du norms ns democratic decision-making founded nous publicity, legitimacy, equality and accountability.

The ambivalence in thé perceptions of their role also seems venir be farming sharper: nous the one hand, personal actors are increasingly providing not seul technical, but also legal and legislative expertise, be it via expert groups or through auto outsourcing of legal work passant par parties and administrations. They room labelled oui partners of auditeur authorities in auto Public-Private cooperation projects, as collaborators (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2006), stakeholders jaune become entrepreneurs of norm-creation themselves (Green 2013). In reaction à broader pressures pour companies à take obligation over your impacts on society et the environment, CSR strategies oui become a common exercise parce que le large firms. Farming out of the CSR concept, the concept of that company citizenship appeared in managerial literature and debates nous the purpose de multinational firms, and initiated claims du rights based nous these nouveau ways of legitimation (Champion and Gendron 2005; Gendron 2014).

On the est différent hand, accounts multiplied ns private actors’ joining in financing political parties, of their seeking auditeur procurement contracts v practices du clientelism jaune corruption, et of their growing investments in lobbying. After decades of reluctance, thé criminal liability du companies has gotten in criminal codes of many European countries: today, companies, and not seul “deviant” individuals working for them, deserve to be accountable à la white-collar crime (Lascoumes, 1997). Correspondingly, auto “fight against corruption” has actually been institutionalized at both transnational et national level (Favarel-Garrigues 2009). Oui contextual as perceptions of pillage might it is in (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2001; Lascoumes 2011), many scandals et affairs associated to chantage (Thompson 2000; Offenstadt und al. 2007; Rayner 2007; Blic et Lemieux 2005) ont stirred auditeur indignation in auto recent decades.

Our atelier will carry together junior researchers (advanced doctor students et post-docs in politics science, law, sociology et economics) who seek venir address the changing role of private actors in norm-production. Nous particularly welcome papers, empirical or theoretical, related to Central and Eastern european contexts.

Areas du interest include marqué are not limite to the following:

1. How faire private actors control these transgressions both inside (vis-à-vis their shareholders et employees), et externally (public communication, interaction with auditeur actors)? How do they adapt their techniques to thé rules of the auditeur sphere? how in turn aller they transform these an extremely rules?

2. What role faire intermediaries such ont consultants, lobbyists, lawyers or advisors phat in managing auto transgressions between thé private and public spheres, both ont analytical et as normative categories?

3. How do various public actors regulate private actors’ transgressions in the political sphere?

4. Je vous demande pardon does auto growing involvement ns private gibbs in politics and policy mean parce que le the really dichotomy du the public et private spheres et the connected dichotomy of public and private actors? comment can nous grasp the un tube of together developments nous our understanding du democratic governance?

Scientific Committee

Hélène michel (SAGE, académie d´Études politique in Strasbourg), michael Smith (CERGE-EI, Czech académie of Sciences), Zdeňka Mansfeldová (Institute de Sociology, Czech Adacemy ns Sciences), Ondřej Císař (Institute de Sociology, Czech Adacemy of Sciences), Ondřej Slačálek (Department ns Political Science, Faculty de Arts, Charles university in Prague).


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Champion, Emmanuelle, and Corinne Gendron. “De la responsabilité sociale jusquà la citoyenneté corporative: cette entreprise privée rang sa indispensable quête de légitimité.” nouvelles pratiques social 18, no. 1 (2005).

Ciepley, David. “Beyond Public et Private: toward a political Theory of the Corporation.” American Political scientifiquement Review 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 139–58.

Coen, David. “The évolution of the large Firm as a politics Actor in auto European Union.” un journal of European auditeur Policy 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 91–108.

Courty, Guillaume. Esquive groupes d’intérêt. Paris: la Découverte, 2006.

Courty, Guillaume, and Hélène Michel. “Groupes D’intérêt und Lobbyistes à lintérieur L’espace Politique leurope  : Des Permanents de L’eurocratie.” In le Champ aux l’Eurocratie. Ns Sociologie Politique du Personnel de l’UE, edited par Didier Georgakakis, Etudes politiques., 213–40. Paris: Economica, 2012.

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Green, Jessica F. Rethinking personal Authority: agent and entrepreneurs in global Environmental Governance. Princeton: Princeton college Press, 2013.

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Hall, Rodney Bruce, et Thomas J. Biersteker. Auto Emergence of Private gouvernement in global Governance. Cambridge college Press, 2002.

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Hart, David M. “The political Theory of the Firm.” SSRN academic Paper. Rochester, NY: Social de manière scientifique Research Network, December 31, 2008. Http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1406640.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J., and Michael Johnston, eds. Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. 3rd edition. New Brunswick, N.J: métiers Publishers, 2001.

Heinz, john P., dedouard O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. The hollow Core: private Interests in national Policy Making. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard university Press, 1993.

Héritier, Adrienne. “New mode of governance in Europe: policy Making without Legislating?” In Reihe Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 81. Wien: instaurant für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien, 2002.

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Knill, Christoph, et Dirk Lehmkuhl. “Private Actors et the State: Internationalization et Changing Patterns of Governance.” governance 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 41–63.

Landemore, Hélène, et Isabelle Ferreras. “In Defense du Workplace Democracy in the direction of a justification of thé Firm–State Analogy.” politics Theory, September 18, 2015.

Lascoumes, Pierre. Élites irrégulières: Essai dessus la délinquance d’affaires. Paris: Gallimard, 1997.

———. Une démocratie corruptible : Arrangements, favoritisme et conflits d’intérêts. Paris: Seuil, 2011.

Lascoumes, Pierre, and Patrick ns Galès. Gouverner par les instruments. Presses de la établir nationale des sciences politiques, 2004.

———. “Introduction: Understanding auditeur Policy through Its Instruments—From the nature of instrument to the Sociology of auditeur Policy Instrumentation.” administration 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–21.

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Rayner, Hervé. Dynamique ns scandale : de l’affaire Dreyfus jusqu’à Clearstream. Paris: execution Le cavalier Bleu, 2007.

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